Introduction This article is a response to Zagouras, Ellick, and Aulisio who presented a case study justifying the questioning of the capacity and autonomy of a young woman with a physical disability who was pregnant and facing coercive pressure to terminate. Case description Julia is described as a 26-year-old woman with a neurological disability that requires her to receive assistance with activities of daily living. She was described as living with her parents who provided her with personal care assistance. Julia (...) became pregnant and her parents wished her to terminate because they did not want to care for her child in addition to her. In fact, Julia's parents threatened her with institutionalization if she did not elect to terminate the pregnancy. Her health care team questioned her decision-making capacity based on her alleged “mental age” and experiences of being sheltered and excluded. The health care team used directive tactics to convince Julia to terminate the pregnancy, which describe as both an ethical and feminist intervention. Discussion The current authors take issue with the case analysis provided by and argue that they neglected to account for numerous instances of systemic ableism that adversely affected Julia, demonstrated prejudicial and judgmental attitudes toward pregnancy and disability, inappropriately questioned her decision-making capacity by infantilizing her, misconstrued the feminist concept of relational autonomy, and colluded with coercive interference from family members. This is a classic example of discriminatory and culturally incompetent reproductive health care for a disabled woman. (shrink)

Providing physiologic support to a brain-dead pregnant decedent poses complex ethical, legal, and clinical challenges. Understanding these considerations is necessary to navigate complex discussion and provide appropriate medical care. We use a theoretical case to examine these considerations and outline a path forward.

Consideration of the counting and reidentification of particulars leads naturally enough to the orthodox doctrine that, “on pain of indefiniteness,” an identity statement in some way involves or presupposes a general term or “covering concept”: i.e., that the principium individuationis or criterion of identity implied depends upon the kind of thing in question. Thus it is said that an auditor understands the question whether A is the same as B only in so far as he knows, however informally or implicitly, (...) the answer to the supplementary question, “The same what?”. (shrink)

The Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization Supreme Court decision not only upended constitutional protections for abortion in the United States but also bolstered legislative and cultural int...

Research suggests that some fathers and birth partners can experience post-traumatic stress disorder after witnessing a traumatic birth. Birth-related PTSD may impact on many aspects of fathers’ and birth partners’ life, including relationship breakdown, self-blame and reducing plans for future children. Despite the potential impact on birth partners’ lives there is currently no measure of birth-related PTSD validated for use with birth partners. The current study therefore adapted the City Birth Trauma Scale for use with birth partners. The City Birth (...) Trauma Scale is a 29-item questionnaire developed to measure birth-related PTSD according to DSM-5 criteria: stressor criteria, symptoms of re-experiencing, avoidance, negative cognitions and mood, and hyperarousal, as well as duration of symptoms, significant distress or impairment, and exclusion criteria or other causes. A sample of 301 fathers/birth partners was recruited online and completed measures of birth-related PTSD, bonding, and demographic details. Results showed the City Birth Trauma Scale had good reliability and psychometric and construct validity. The fathers/birth partners version has the same two-factor structure as the original scale: general symptoms and birth-related symptoms, which accounted for 51% of the variance. PTSD symptoms were associated with preterm birth and maternal and infant complications. Overall, the City Birth Trauma Scale provides a promising measure of PTSD following childbirth that can be used in research and clinical practice. (shrink)

Animal-care workers are at risk of compassion fatigue (i.e., experiencing burnout and secondary traumatic stress [STS]) which has been shown to adversely impact employee wellbeing, organizational productivity, and caregiving quality in other caregiving fields. The current cross-cultural analysis explored compassion fatigue among 46 primate sanctuary workers across three continents who completed the Professional Quality of Life (ProQOL) scale and Trauma-Informed Organizational Culture (TIOC) survey, and answered questions about their work. Higher compassion satisfaction (CS) and lower compassion fatigue were observed in (...) primate care workers compared to previously published animal-care worker samples. CS negatively correlated with burnout whereas burnout positively correlated with STS. Workplace support positively correlated with CS while supervisory and peer support negatively correlated with burnout. Lastly, African-residing respondents had higher burnout and STS than did European- and North American-residing respondents and more often mentioned conservation concerns and recovery and release of animals as important elements of their work. (shrink)

Bu makale, Râgıb el-Isfahânî’nin hayatı, kisiligi, mezhebî mensubiyeti ve çok yönlü bilimselligi konularını ihtiva eden birinci makalemizin mütemmimi olarak tasarlanmıstır. Burada öncelikle Râgıb el-Isfahânî’nin, yetkin oldugu bilimsel alanlar basta olmak üzere, yazma ve matbu eserleriyle tüm ilmî mirası tanıtılacaktır. "kinci olarak da bu eserler üzerinde yapılan -ulasabildigimiz- bütün çalısmalar ele alınacaktır. Maksadımız, bir taraftan Râgıb’ın ilmî mirasını yazmasıyla matbusuyla ortaya koymak; kendisine nispet edilen eserlerin ona ait olup olmadıgını tespite çalısmak; öte yandan da üzerine yapılan çalısmaları serdetmek suretiyle Râgıb’ın hak (...) ettigi ileri akademik ilgiyi artırmaktır. (shrink)

One of the important domestic developments during the Umayyad period is the rebellions carried out by members of the Ahl al-bayt. After the rebellion of Zayd b. ʿAlī in Kufa, his father, Yaḥyā was intensely prosecuted by the governor of Iraq Yūsuf b. ʿUmar, so he moved to Khurāsān, where he would feel more secure and his supporters were located. In fact, ʿAbbāsids, Kaysānī and Zayd b. ʿAlī’s supporters were active in Khurāsān. Under these circumtances, Yaḥyā left Iraq and followed (...) the road Nineveh, Madāʾin, Ray, Nīshāpūr towards the east and came to Sarakhs and resided here about six months. Here, a group from the Khārijites came and made a revolt proposal, but this proposal was rejected by those with Yahya. After this, Yaḥyā continued on his way to the east and came to Balkh and he stayed until the death of the caliph Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik. The general purpose of Yaḥyā’s journey from Iraq to Balkh is probably to get rid of the prosecution of Iraqi governor Yūsuf, and to establish the appropriate political atmosphere for the rebellion by contacting the Ahl al-bayt supporters in Khurāsān. The governor of Iraq Yūsuf b. ʿUmar determined the location of Yaḥyā in Balhk, and he ordered the governor of Khurāsān Naṣr b. Sayyār that he ensured Yaḥyā was imprisoned in Marw. However, as his imprisonment was reported to the caliph al-Walīd b. Yazīd, he ordered him to be released. Governor Naṣr advised Yaḥyā to go directly to the caliph and avoid situations that could cause sedition. In this case, Yaḥyā first came to Sarakhs, and then reached Nīshāpūr via Ṭūs. Meanwhile, the Khurāsān governor Naṣr wrote a letter to the governors on the route and ordered them to follow the movements of Yaḥyā and to not allow him to stay in the cities for a long time. Yaḥyā did not advance further west from the city of Bayhaq because he was afraid he might be killed by the Iraqi governor. Therefore, he returned from Bayhaq and came to Nīshāpūr. Here, they confiscated the mounts of a caravan they encountered on the way along with seventy other people, but they also paid their fees. Due to this incident, the governor of Nīshāpūr sent soldiers to Yaḥyā and his entourage, but in the clash that broke out, the supporters of Yaḥyā were successful against the soldiers, who were more than them. Yaḥyā and his followers continued their movements towards Balkh in the east after that. Even though the sources do not fully state the reason for Yaḥyā 's movement to Balkh, the geographical distance and the possible Shīʿī potential in the region may have guided him. However, this time Yaḥyā aimed to reach Balkh via Herat and Jūzjān by traveling in the southeast direction, not via Marw. Upon the news that Yaḥyā reached Jūzjān, the governor Naṣr sent an army of eight thousand men on him. Yaḥyā had to fight against the Umayyad army with his small number of supporters, consisting of seventy or one hundred and twenty people. As a result, he and his supporters were killed. Yaḥyā's head was cut off from his body and sent to the caliph, and his body was hung over the entrance gate of the city of Jūzjān. There are some reasons why the revolt of Yaḥyā failed. First of all, Yaḥyā did not prepare a road map to follow in advance for the rebellion movement, and he could not communicate with a large mass of people and did not set his goal. Secondly, Yaḥyā did not have enough support to resist the Umayyad armies in the rebellion. As a result, we can conclude that Yaḥyā was hidden during the three-year period he spent in Khurāsān because he was under prosecution and therefore could not operate openly. In addition, he could not get enough support from the Shīʿī communities in the region. Although Yaḥyā's rebellion was unsuccessful, it had some effects on the peoples of the region in the following process. Especially the murder of Yaḥyā in Khurāsān helped to create a suitable ground for the ʿAbbāsid revolution. In addition, it ensured that all Shīʿī groups were gathered under the invitation of the ʿAbbāsid "Āl-i Muḥammad”. (shrink)

Pythagoras -- Confucius -- Heracleitus -- Parmenides -- Zeno of Elea -- Socrates -- Democritus -- Plato -- Aristotle -- Mencius -- Zhuangzi -- Pyrrhon of Elis -- Epicurus -- Zeno of Citium -- Philo Judaeus -- Marcus Aurelius -- Nagarjuna -- Plotinus -- Sextus Empiricus -- Saint Augustine -- Hypatia -- Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius -- Śaṅkara -- Yaqūb ibn Ishāq aṣ-Ṣabāḥ al-Kindī -- Al-Fārābī -- Avicenna -- Rāmānuja -- Ibn Gabirol -- Saint Anselm of Canterbury -- al-Ghazālī -- (...) Peter Abelard -- Averroës -- Zhu Xi -- Moses Maimonides -- Ibn al-'Arabī -- Shinran -- Saint Thomas Aquinas -- John Duns Scotus -- William of Ockham -- Niccolò Machiavelli -- Wang Yangming -- Francis Bacon, Viscount Saint Alban (or Albans), Baron of Verulam -- Thomas Hobbes -- René Descartes -- John Locke -- Benedict de Spinoza -- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz -- Giambattista Vico -- George Berkeley -- Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu -- David Hume -- Jean-Jacques Rousseau -- Immanuel Kant -- Moses Mendelssohn -- Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet -- Jeremy Bentham -- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel -- Arthur Schopenhauer -- Auguste Comte -- John Stuart Mill -- Søren Kierkegaard -- Karl Marx -- Herbert Spencer -- Wilhelm Dilthey -- William James -- Friedrich Nietzsche -- Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege -- Edmund Husserl -- Henri Bergson -- John Dewey -- Alfred North Whitehead -- Benedetto Croce -- Nishida Kitarō -- Bertrand Russell -- G.E. Moore -- Martin Buber -- Ludwig Wittgenstein -- Martin Heidegger -- Rudolf Carnap -- Sir Karl Popper -- Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno -- Jean-Paul Sartre -- Hannah Arendt -- Simone de Beauvoir -- Willard Van Orman Quine -- Sir A.J. Ayer -- Wilfrid Sellars -- John Rawls -- Thomas S. Kuhn -- Michel Foucault -- Noam Chomsky -- Jürgeb Gabernas -- Sir Bernard Williams -- Jacques Derrida -- Richard Rorty -- Robert Nozick -- Saul Kripke -- David Kellogg Lewis -- Peter (Albert David) Singer. (shrink)

In a recent paper M.R. Ayers attacks two widely held doctrines: Non-arbitary individuation requires principles of individuation and these are supplies only by sortal general terms. It is possible for an item a to be the same as b but not the same as b.I shall follow Ayers in calling a theory which includes both and ‘conceptualist’ or ‘sortalist’, but I shall not allow him to appropriate the honorific term ‘realist’ for his own theory, which I shall term (...) ‘absolutist’. My sole purpose here is to defend and in turn against Ayers’ attacks on them. Thus I shall ignore intermediate positions which accept but reject or vice-versa.Ayers’ paper is long and in many respects obscure; there are many points in it which require discussion but which can't receive it here for lack of space. In particular, I shall ignore his lengthy comments on the constitutive ‘is’, and also the wider metaphysical remarks in his conclusion and the postscript on Dummett. (shrink)

In September of 1965 G. H. von Wright discovered in Vienna a hitherto unknown notebook written in pencil by Wittgenstein. The first part contains an early, but essentially complete version of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Since it contains the dedication to David H. Pinsent who died May 8, 1918, von Wright dates its composition just before the final composition of the Tractatus in the summer of 1918. This is confirmed by the remaining portion of the manuscript which contains additions and further (...) elucidations to the Prototractatus plus a Preface, all of which are found, virtually unchanged, in the final version of the Tractatus. This edition contains a quite readable facsimile of the entire manuscript, an edition of the text of the Prototractatus that indicates its differences from the final text and a translation en regard by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. A lengthy introduction by von Wright on the publication history of the Tractatus and a concluding set of Tables indicating parallel passages between the Tractatus and Prototractatus as well as those portions of each work which have nothing corresponding in the other, complete the volume. In view of the fact that Wittgenstein on his last visit to Vienna before his death ordered that the several notebooks which still existed from the time of germination of the Tractatus be destroyed, one might ask just what contribution this expensive edition of the Prototractatus may be expected to make to our understanding of Wittgenstein's thought. Unlike the 1914-1916 Notebooks, which by some happy accident escaped the destruct order, the Prototractatus does not seem to differ in any significant substantive way from the final printed version. This is to be expected if von Wright's dating of the work is correct. Hence, while the historian of literature may be delighted with the present text, the student of philosophy may find it disappointing. What does make the present volume of value, however, is von Wright's historical introduction with its reproduction of many of Wittgenstein's letters to various prospective publishers. Of especial interest in this connection is Wittgenstein's illuminating comment to Ludwig von Ficker of Innsbruck, editor of Der Brenner, that "the book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which... will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts; the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book." This would seem to confirm Anscombe's interpretation of Tractatus 6.52 rather than Ayer's and that of the Vienna Circle.--A. B. W. (shrink)

This work represents an attempt to assess the nature and extent of Moore's influence on twentieth century philosophy. The essays it contains were all written in or after 1958, the year of Moore's death, by philosophers whom he knew and respected. As such the writers were often able to highlight certain neglected aspects of his thought as well as ideas he never put in print. Though 10 of the 19 essays have appeared in print before, there are original papers by (...) Ryle, Ewing, William and Martha Kneale, Ayer, Lazerowitz and Urmson as well as somewhat longer studies by Kennick, Greig and Redpath. Together they deal with practically every aspect of Moore's metaphysical and ethical views, his often misunderstood philosophy of common sense, and the special methodology he thought particularly appropriate for investigating philosophical problems. In addition to special treatises on his views on utilitarianism, the naturalistic fallacy, free will, and propositions, the book is introduced with the delightful biographical study Braithwaite did for the Proceedings of the British Academy. The editors see Moore's writings not only as a model of the standard of exactness and refinement of thought one has come to expect of a careful philosopher, but as altering the direction of philosophical investigation. His method of analysis, and especially his ability to translate abstract formulations into concrete meanings, opened the eyes of philosophers to the fuzzy aspects and latent confusions in their own views and arguments. As his former pupils, the editors may be excused for feeling that philosophy after Moore will never be the same as before, but by bringing together this fine selection of essays they have done much to insure his contribution will not be forgotten.--A. B. W. (shrink)

The eight relatively short papers in this volume were first presented at the International Institute of Philosophy Entretiens held at Helsinki in 1970. Four main topics are considered: the definition of knowledge, memory, Wittgenstein’s theory of knowledge, and evidence. Representing the first topic, B. A. O. Williams’ paper "Knowledge and Reasons" is chiefly directed toward examining the role of reasons in knowledge. His main thesis is that when speaking in general about knowledge, it is not necessary either that "the knower (...) be able to support or ground his true belief by reference to other propositions" or "that he be in any special state" concerning his belief. Yet it is necessary that, "given the truth of p, it is no accident that A believes p rather than not-p." The author is quick to indicate that this formula is highly schematic and, as an analysis of knowledge, insufficient. A. J. Ayer, as commentator on Williams’ paper, tends to concur with and further amplify a number of Williams’ ideas. However, he does take issue with Williams on two main points: his remarks on the possibility of "radically impersonal knowledge" and his formula that true belief should not be accidental. Concerning the latter, Ayer, while aware of the outline form of Williams’ argument, is "sceptical of its power to yield a precise formula which would differentiate between knowledge and true belief" in a satisfactory manner. (shrink)

The question asked by the title of this book is certainly one which haunts much philosophical inquiry in this century. It is a question worth asking, and Hacking warns us not to expect to find some one, general answer to it. Instead of embarking on an abstract consideration of this issue, the author undertakes a series of case studies dealing with particular philosophers to see how they have approached language and its relation to philosophy. His inquiry falls into three main (...) parts: part A, entitled "The Heyday of Ideas," which deals with philosophical work done in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; part B, "The Heyday of Meaning," which deals with early twentieth century atomist/positivistic approaches to philosophy and language; and part C, "The Heyday of Sentences," which considers contemporary philosophers who study theory construction and sentential systems. There are many philosophers whom Hacking examines: part A includes a discussion of Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley, as well as the logic of the Port Royal school; part B discusses Chomsky, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ayer; and part C discusses Feyerabend and Davidson, as well as introducing some of the ideas of Quine and Popper. (shrink)

Olthuis makes a singular contribution in bringing the "Philosophy of the Law-Idea" to the attention of philosophers who lack other access to this development in contemporary Dutch thought. His presentation concentrates on applications to ethics. He begins with a thorough exposition of G. E. Moore's ethical theory, to which he applies "history's critique"--a resumé of Ayer and Stevenson, of Oxford meta-ethics, and of the "new wave" of naturalism set in motion by Anscombe and Foot in 1958. Olthuis finds that neither (...) Moore nor the subsequent philosophers could long stave off the irreconcilable extreme of absolute value or absolute relativism. "... the main source of difficulty in the constrictive nature of the... ontological schema," and, underlying that, in the claim that theoretical thought is neutral. In a valuable final chapter, he presents a "perspective for a way out" based on work by H. Dooyeweerd and D. H. Th. Vollenhoven. One key to their Philosophy of the Law-Idea lies in "norm-laws." Like "natural" laws, what is subject to them cannot withdraw. Unlike "natural" laws, they demand human acknowledgment to be fulfilled. He rejects both "ought" and "goodness" as adequate primitive concepts for ethics in favor of stress upon its irreducible "sphere-sovereignty." The cosmos stands under a structural law-order, made up of many modal laws determining the many modalities of reality. Within the normative, ethics is only one special modal science. Its job is to investigate the ethical norm-law, that which is subject to it, and the correlations between these two.--M. B. M. (shrink)

The editors tell us this book is an outgrowth of their course in philosophical arguments. It contains both readings from traditional sources, and new material especially for this book. It is thus of interest as a potential text, as a source book, and for its original contributions. To consider it first as a text, it would be a challenging and valuable choice for sophisticated students. As a source-book, it is a good anthology of hard-core arguments on seven metaphysical topics. Authors (...) selected include Aristotle, Plato, Church Fathers, Rationalists, Locke and Hume, Bradley and Moore, Kant, Frege, Carnap, C. I. Lewis, Russell, and others. Selections run from a page or two to 16-page Hume excerpts. The last section, on The Nature of Metaphysics, contains essays newly written for this volume by A. J. Ayer, Brand Blanshard, John Passmore, and M. Lazerowitz. Other new material elsewhere in the book includes Alice Ambrose on Wittgenstein, and the introduction by W. E. Kennick. The latter suggests that in metaphysics there are arguments but no proofs, and that metaphysics has four curious characteristics: its disputes are never resolved; in these disputes the array of experts on each side is likely to be equally impressive; antinomies seem unavoidable; and metaphysics frequently conflicts with common sense. Ayer's article is called "Metaphysics and Common Sense." Using Carnap's distinction of "internal" and "external" questions, he finds metaphysical questions to be external. His explanation of what these are and why anyone would wish to raise them yields three legitimate ways in which metaphysics can add to our understanding of the world, and concludes that "it would be a mistake to forego the more imaginative kinds of conceptual exploration." In both tone and content this essay is a surprise for readers who know earlier work by Ayer. Passmore attempts to correct the popular tendency to confuse the philosopher with the sage. He places metaphysics, mathematics, and empirical science within "rational discussion": each is speculation, each has its characteristic control procedure. Blanshard's article attempts to defend metaphysics against criticisms such as those made by Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Freud. Lazerowitz treats the thesis that "metaphysics works by unseen paradoxes."--M. B. M. (shrink)

In many Catholic colleges the first exposure to philosophy is a course in the philosophy of man. The text-anthology is specifically designed for use in such courses and forms one third of a series with further volumes on metaphysics and ethics. Views on man's knowledge, freedom, unity, and immortality, are presented in short selections from five philosophical traditions. Each section has an introductory essay, a glossary, topics for student discussion and term papers, and a short bibliography. A contributing editor is (...) responsible for each section. The general editors coordinated the study aids, including a list of films related to the teaching of philosophy. Elizabeth Salmon edited Classical and Scholastic Thought: Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. Robert Kreyche edited American Pragmatic-Naturalist Thought: Peirce, James, Dewey, and Santayana. The section on Dialectical Thought, edited by R. T. DeGeorge contains, in addition to Hegel, Marx, and Engels, a selection from a book by Adam Schaff. Margaret Gorman edited Analytic-Positivist Thought. This section includes Hume, Russell, Ayer, Carnap, Ryle, Strawson, Hampshire, and Wittgenstein. Although pointing out to students that the interests of this tradition preclude discussion of the reality behind the four core problems, the introductory section is appreciative of the analytic method. The final part, Existentialist-Phenomenological Thought, is edited by R. Sokolowski. A passage from a forthcoming translation of Husserl's Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, sets the problem; readings from Sartre, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, and August Brunner treat the themes of temporality, corporeal space, intersubjectivity, decisions, the emotions, and speech. Finally, short passages from Heidegger tell the reader that the above factors "open man to being." In this way the Phenomenological-Existentialist school is shown to provide a philosophy of man which can serve as a first step in metaphysics, and thus as a bridge to the next book in the series.--M. B. M. (shrink)

In Alfred Ayer's article, philosophy is sharply counterposed to science, is denied the status of a science. This is the leitmotif of his entire paper. Moreover, the defense of this conception is characteristic of many representatives of neopositivism who go along with Ayer. However, Ayer has certain distinctive ideas of his own, which require critical analysis. Fundamental among them is his acknowledgment of the extremely general character of the concepts and principles with which philosophy, as distinct from the special sciences, (...) operates. This universality which is the distinguishing characteristic of philosophy is then transformed into an argument against the recognition of philosophy as a science. In replying to Ayer we shall attempt to demonstrate that his acknowledgment by no means necessitates the elimination of philosophy from the list of the sciences, but merely emphasizes its distinctive, that is, its general character, in contrast to all other sciences, which are particular in nature. This is the theme of the present article. (shrink)

Die Bedeutung religiöser Sprache gehört von Beginn an zu den Themen analytischer Religionsphilosophie. Ihre Anfangsjahre (seit den 1930ern) sind geprägt von der Debatte um den hauptsächlich von Alfred Ayer in seinem programmatischen Buch Language, Truth and Logic (Ayer 1970) und von Rudolf Carnap (2004) erhobenen positivistischen Sinnlosigkeitsvorwurf: Religiöse Sätze sind nicht empirisch verifizierbar und damit kognitiv sinnlos. Diese Auseinandersetzung mit dem Logischen Empirismus bestimmt die Debatten der Nachkriegszeit. Während Antony Flew den Einwand auf der Basis des Begriffs der Falsifikation neu (...) formuliert, entwickeln Richard Braithwaite, Richard Hare, Basil Mitchell, Ian Crombie und andere teils elaborierte Erwiderungen, die versuchen, die Eigenheit religiöser Sprache in Abgrenzung von den empirischen Wissenschaften herauszuarbeiten (alle in Dalferth 1974). (shrink)

Die Bedeutung religiöser Sprache gehört von Beginn an zu den Themen analytischer Religionsphilosophie. Ihre Anfangsjahre sind geprägt von der Debatte um den hauptsächlich von Alfred Ayer in seinem programmatischen Buch Language, Truth and Logic und von Rudolf Carnap erhobenen positivistischen Sinnlosigkeitsvorwurf: Religiöse Sätze sind nicht empirisch verifizierbar und damit kognitiv sinnlos. Diese Auseinandersetzung mit dem Logischen Empirismus bestimmt die Debatten der Nachkriegszeit. Während Antony Flew den Einwand auf der Basis des Begriffs der Falsifikation neu formuliert, entwickeln Richard Braithwaite, Richard Hare, (...) Basil Mitchell, Ian Crombie und andere teils elaborierte Erwiderungen, die versuchen, die Eigenheit religiöser Sprache in Abgrenzung von den empirischen Wissenschaften herauszuarbeiten. (shrink)

1986 is the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, which is commonly considered one of the most influential books in twentieth-century philosophy. These essays offer a comprehensive appraisal of the influence and impact of Ayer's work and analyze the ways in which Ayer's arguments have been absorbed, modified, or rejected by various philosophers. A noteworthy feature of the book is an original essay by A. J. Ayer that assesses the influence of his work (...) in philosophy over the last fifty years. (shrink)

The eight essays assembled under this title were originally presented at the 1965 Great Thinkers Forum sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Religion at the University of Georgia. These essays are now being published in the conviction that they all make "valuable contributions toward the understanding and resolution of the contemporary challenge to theology and religion." The challenge in question is the one that comes from neopositivism and linguistic analysis. By the time the reader comes to the end of (...) his own effort he finds himself wondering in what sense the 1965 papers are to count as valuable contributions. No doubt they are valuable in the sense that it is worthwhile watching a single-minded philosopher pouring his soul out in an attempt at showing how the "disguised nonsense" of religious language is "patent nonsense," or how the "putatively factual assertions" of religious language are "bogus, pseudo-factual statements, devoid of the kind of intelligibility that believers rightly demand of them." Along the way one may collect pearls of rare beauty, such as the statement that "There is no convention in English or logical rule which makes ‘there is no God’ a contradiction," or questions such as "Who has observed him under controlled conditions?" Another contribution of the same general usefulness may well be that the thoughtful reader is being initiated to the exertions of that transformational hermeneutics by which pseudo-assertive religious statements are being rescued from wholesale meaninglessness, and accorded the innocuous meaningfulness of emotive or convictional language, or of disguised moral discourse. Professor Frank H. Harrison III makes an interesting attempt at injecting into the landscape, linguistically and epistemologically so bleak, what he calls "knowledge by acquaintance," which is in his vocabulary the equivalent of what mysticism calls amor Dei, and Antoine de Saint-Exupéry describes as a seeing with the heart. The discussion of myth by Professor Robert H. Ayers ignores what happens to be the heart of the matter in mythic thinking, namely the absence of the distinction between object and subject, but does provide a good introduction to the "profusion of confusion" that flourishes around myth, "one of the most traveled hobos in our times.". (shrink)

The term “logical behaviorism” covers a multitude of sins and sinners and has not always been applied correctly. Here I consider certain aspects of the cases presented by A.J. Ayer’s Language Truth and Logic and his later rejection of it, and Carnap’s view on the demands that physicalism makes of the language of psychology. It is argued that while Ayer was a logical behaviorist (albeit in some ways nonstandard), Carnap was not (neither standard nor nonstandard) and that because of this (...) difference, Carnap’s account of our knowledge of other minds was comparatively more successful than Ayer’s. © 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved. (shrink)

Discussions of American philosophy have too frequently fallen into two extreme categories: slavish and plodding exposition; and supercilious and superficial criticism. But what the "classic" American philosophers need is sympathetic but judicious criticism. This book is a model of such criticism. Basically, it consists of two relatively independent monographs--one dealing with Peirce and one with James. Ayer makes no claims to produce a work of historical scholarship. And scholars will find much to quarrel with in this book. But their argument (...) will be with an intelligent and lucid critic. What is especially satisfying is the way in which Ayer discusses some of the more obscure aspects of these philosophers such as Peirce's categories and his theory of signs, and the way in which he attempts to make sense of some of their more controversial claims such as those of James in the Will to Believe. Ayer pulls no punches in pointing out what he takes to be mistaken and untenable; throughout there is a critical dialogue. One can disagree on numerous points of interpretation, but one can only admire the high level of critique. This is the sort of intelligent criticism that these two seminal thinkers deserve.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The author has made this treatise on Madhva’s realistic school of Ved?nta philosophy convincing to the modern mind by employing western logical apparatus in substantiating Madhva’s ideas. Following the Indian classical tradition, the author has examined the validity of Advaitaved?nta, the Absolute Monism of ?a?kara and Bh?skara as P?rvapak?a, and logically proved its inconsistencies. He has then established the Dvaitasiddh?nta i.e., the Monotheistic Dualism of Madhva. He has successfully brought out the nuances of the realistic school of Indian philosophical (...) thought in this work. A Modern Introduction to M?dhva Philosophy is Prof B H Kotabagi’s posthumous publication. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. The ordinary language philosophy (OLP) is a set of interconnected philosophical approaches that have been practiced by analytical philosophers, mainly in Great Britain and the USA, since the middle of the 20th century. Its discursive space is outlined by the methodological developments and ideas of L. Wittgenstein and J. Austin, as well as the works of G. Ryall, P. Strawson, R. Hare and N. Malcolm. P. Grice and D. Davidson are (...) often included in this school, although their works are also associated with the end of the classical period of the OLP. However, modern interest in this direction indicates the prematureness of statements about its end, setting before philosophers the task of rethinking the reasons for the temporary decline of attention and rediscovering its potential for enriching the methodology of analytic philosophy. M e t h o d s. The article used the method of historical and philosophical reconstruction to clarify the conditions for the formation of the philosophy of everyday language, general scientific methods of cognition: analysis, synthesis, generalization to clarify key ideas and concepts that influenced the formation of the method of linguistic analysis, as well as methods of systematization and comparison. R e s u l t s. Within the framework of the work, the periodization of the OLP was clarified, in particular, the stage of the early OLP and the classical period, which falls on the 50s of the twentieth century, were determined and presented by the works of representatives of the University of Oxford G. Ryle, J. Austin and P. Strawson. Also, key differences between the philosophy of ideal language, which is represented by the views of A. J. Ayer and the OLP in the interpretation of J. Wisdom, in particular, a different interpretation of linguistic analysis, were identified. C o n c l u s i o n s. Linguistic analysis takes on a completely different appearance in the interpretation of the OLP compared to the ideas of A. J. Ayer. The real value of linguistic analysis within the OLP, as J. Wisdom demonstrates, lies in its ability to demonstrate the amazing dexterity of ordinary language. Ordinary language allows us to express the most subtle distinctions, nuances of meaning, intentions, and goals. This realization refutes the thesis of ideal language, which suggests that ordinary language obscures reality. On the contrary, ordinary language uses provide a reference to reality with an impressive level of detail and descriptive power that no artificial language can surpass. This ability is due not only to the function of language as a tool of representation, but also to its evolutionary adaptation to a variety of practical needs. (shrink)

Passmore is one of the most outstanding historians of the contemporary philosophical scene. He seems to have read everything, digested it, and has an uncanny ability to empathize with diverse philosophical viewpoints and elucidate them in a clear, witty, cogent style. Although the first three quarters of this revised edition is basically the same as earlier editions, we now have additions to his account of Ayer, Popper, Wittgenstein and Sartre; enlarged sections on Austin, Jaspers and Heidegger; a new section on (...) Merleau-Ponty and a chapter bringing us right up to the present discussions of the mind-body problem in Anglo-Saxon philosophy. With this revised edition, one feels more acutely the pinch of the limitations that Passmore initially set for himself, viz., to treat the ideas of those writers that entered into the public domain of philosophical discussion in England during the past hundred years. Consequently his treatment of continental thinkers is not nearly as complete or perceptive as his treatment of British philosophers, or his chapters on "classical" American thinkers which are among the best written by anybody.—R. J. B. (shrink)

"[Reading Ebersole] requires and often succeeds in producing a radical reorientation of one´s thinking . . . " from a book review Things We Know is a collection of fifteen essays that focus on perennial philosophical problems about knowledge. The essays let you participate in Frank Ebersole´s unique struggles to come to terms with such questions as: Can we know the world? . . . the past? . . . the future? . . . of God´s existence? . . . (...) whether our actions are free? . . . the foundations of logic and language? This is not just another philosophy book about problems of knowledge. In Things We Know, Ebersole, by carefully using examples, exposes the problems to be the products of philosophical pictures. The examples also make the pictures less compelling. Thus, by reading this philosophy book readers can join the author in working to free themselves from some perplexing philosophical concerns. How the Second Edition differs from the First Edition This edition differs from the First Edition (University of Oregon Books, 1967) in three ways. An essay is added. "Everyman´s Ontological Argument" has been inserted as Essay 14, following two other essays about the ontological argument. "Everyman´s Ontological Argument" was published in the Fall 1978 issue of Philosophical Investigations. (The original Chapter 14, "Where the Action Is," is now Chapter 15.) An essay is replaced. The original Essay 3, "How Philosophers See Stars," has been replaced by a modified version that was printed in Philosophy Today (no. 2, 1969). The replacement includes some further improvements. The text is improved. Throughout the book, the author has made corrections, stylistic improvements, and changed the wording as needed to make clearer his line of thought. Summary Each of the fifteen essays takes up a philosophical problem. In most of the essays, Ebersole first clarifies the problem and reviews common attempts to resolve the problem. Then he focuses on the central ideas and terms used to state the problem and creates examples of people using the terms under consideration. The examples are unique because of their focus on the context and point of what we say. If his investigations fail to find a use of the terms that supports the philosophical problem, he is led to conclude that the problem does not really derive from a philosophical insight but rather arises from a philosophical picture or model. Preface The essays in Things We Know address some of the perennial philosophical problems of knowledge. The essays are unified by being similar in method and philosophic aim. Ebersole exposes a picture behind each problem. In the essays he works through some of the ways that pictures control our thinking and tries to make the pictures less compelling. Chapters 1 6: Perception and Language Chapter 1: "Seeing Red in Red Things" Philosophical problem: Must words for simple visual properties (e.g., "red") refer to things because the things share some property (e.g., redness)? Can we see this property? Topics investigated: Family resemblances, properties of colors, when we regard things as the same, when we regard colors as the same, when we regard things as having common properties, language-world philosophical pictures. Philosophers discussed: A. J. Ayer, J. Herder, J. S. Mill. Chapter 2: "Seeing Things" Philosophical problem: Do hallucinations and afterimage. (shrink)

By "scepticism" Naess means an activity or characteristic attitude, anti-conceptual, non-assertive, and ad hoc. The real sceptic has not yet happened on an argument with no countervailing ones, but he is a "great champion of trust and confidence and of common sense in action." This sceptic is the Pyrrhonist as pictured by Sextus Empiricus; the sceptic of twentieth century epistemology, who asserts that we don't know what we think we do, would be called an Academician. After chapters on historical, psychological, (...) and psychiatric aspects of Pyrrhonism, the author illustrates the Academic-Sceptic distinction in a closely argued chapter on the Ayer-Chisholm analysis of "S knows that p." Naess holds that the applicability of a claim to know is a function of the definiteness of intention. Therefore, there are conditions under which the know-don't know distinction cannot be usefully applied. It is one thing, with Moore and Pap, to agree that one has got his right hand, and another to assert that "I know physical objects exist." Naess' sceptic does not commit himself when both assertion and denial involve doctrinally contaminated ways of expression.--M. B. M. (shrink)

This is an extremely well-edited collection of articles dealing with Austin. A number of articles help to present general biographical information and to provide an overview of the man and his philosophic style. Three sections of this anthology are divided so as to include papers that deal with issues raised in Austin's Philosophical Papers, Sense and Sensibilia, and How to Do Thing with Words. Papers are included by those who are sympathetic and admire Austin's work as well as those who (...) have been very critical of his work. Altogether this symposium includes a judicious selection of some of the best articles dealing with Austin. There are papers by Warnock, Urmson, Hampshire, Pears, Cavell, Quine, Chisholm, Ayer, Searle, etc. There is a bibliography of Austin's writings as well as writings about Austin.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Partant des considérations des analystes (Moore, Ayer, Austin) et principalement des phénoménologues (Husserl, Ingarden), Pauteur passe en revue différents types de la connaissance immédiate. Le contenu de l'article est le suivant: 0. Considérations préliminaires, 1. Définition de la connaissance. Conscience, 2. Immédiatelé de la connaissance, 3. Perception sensorielle extérieure, 4. Perception sensorielle intérieure, 5. Autoconscience (Durchleben, perception intérieure, perception immanente, rétrospection), 6. Perception du psychisme de Pautre, 7. Remémoration, 8. Quasi-perception. Perception esthétique, 9. Perception intellectuelle (compréhension, intellection, vision eidétique, appréhension (...) notionnelle), 10. Connaissance conditionnée et non conditionnée. Connaissance indirecte, 11. Justification et indication de la connaissance immédiate, 12. Revision des conclusions. Classifications de la connaissance immédiate. Litterature. (shrink)

Cicero, Yasalar Üzerine (De Legibus) adlı eserinin birinci kitabının beşinci bölümünde Herodot’a (yaklaşık MÖ 484-MÖ 425) (Grekçe: Herodotos, Latince ve İngilizce: Herodotus) “tarihin babası” (pater historiae) unvanını verir. Bu nitelendirme, Herodot’un historiai kavramını ilk kez sistemli biçimde kullanan, sorgulayan ve yazılı hâle getiren kişi olarak kabul edildiğini göstermektedir. Herodot yalnızca Antik Çağ tarihinin değil aynı zamanda tarih felsefesinin de kurucu figürlerinden biri olarak değerlendirilir (Evans, 1985, s. 556). Historiai (İngilizce “Histories” ya da “History”, Türkçe “Tarih” olarak çevrilmiştir) adlı eseri sadece (...) olayların kronolojik bir dizimini sunmakla kalmaz aynı zamanda geçmişi anlamaya yönelik entelektüel bir çaba olarak da öne çıkar. Bu eser, Pers İmparatorluğu’nun yükselişine dair bilinen en eski anlatılardan biri olup, MÖ 5. yüzyıldaki Pers-Yunan Savaşları’nın nedenlerini ve gelişimini tarihsel bağlam içinde ele alır. Herodot bu çatışmayı yalnızca bir siyasal mücadele olarak değil kölelik ile özgürlük arasında temellenen ilkesel bir karşılaşma olarak çerçeveler. Bir yanda baskıcı Pers İmparatorluğu, diğer yanda ise Atinalıların öncülüğünde birleşmiş Yunan polisleri yer alır. Günümüzdeki edisyonlarda dokuz kitaba ayrılan Historiai [Tarih], her biri geleneksel olarak dokuz Musa’dan (Mousai: İlham Perisi ya da Tanrıçası) biriyle adlandırılan bölümler hâlindedir (Ríos Gordillo, 2021, s. 102-103). Bu adlandırma Antik Çağ’da Herodot’un kendisi tarafından yapılmamış daha sonra gelen İskenderiyeli bilim insanları tarafından uygulanmıştır. Eser tarihsel bilgi ile anlatı, deneyim ile sorgulama, öğretici ahlak anlayışı ile eleştirel düşünce arasında bir köprü kurar. Ancak içerdiği mitolojik ve efsanevi unsurlar nedeniyle Antik Çağ’dan bu yana olayların doğruluğu ile ilgili tartışmalara da konu olmuştur. Cicero ve Plutarkhos gibi düşünürler tarafından “yalanların babası” olarak nitelenmesi (Bowen, 1992, s. 3), onun tarih anlayışına yönelik bu ikircikli bakışı yansıtır. Tüm bu değerlendirmeler ışığında Herodot’un tarih anlayışının hem özgünlüğü hem de dönemi için taşıdığı yenilik daha iyi anlaşılmaktadır. Herodot’un Historiai [Tarih] adlı kitabının ilk cümlesi, onun tarihyazımındaki amacını ve yöntemini doğrudan ortaya koyar: “Halikarnassoslu [Bodrum] Herodot’un sunduğu bu araştırma, insanların yaptıkları şeylerin zamanla unutulmaması, Helenler [Yunanlılar] ile barbarların [Yunanlı olmayanların] sergilediği büyük ve hayranlık uyandıran eylemlerin ünlerini kaybetmemesi ve aralarındaki savaşın nedenlerinin anlaşılması içindir” (çev. Godley, 2013, I.1, s. 1). Bu cümle, Herodot’un tarihyazımını Grekçedeki “historiai” yani araştırma ve soruşturma anlamıyla tanımladığını; başlıca amacının insan eylemlerini unutturmamak ve bu eylemlerin ardındaki nedenleri sorgulamak olduğunu göstermektedir. Salt kronolojik bilgi sunmakla yetinmeyen bu yaklaşımı sayesinde Herodot, tarih felsefesinin ilk temsilcilerinden biri olarak kabul edilir. Herodot’un tarih anlayışını değerlendirmek hem kullandığı tarih yazımı yöntemlerine hem de Historiai (Tarih) adlı eserinde ortaya koyduğu felsefi arka plana bütüncül bir bakışla yaklaşmayı zorunlu kılar. Bu bağlamda, Herodot’un kaynak kullanımı, eleştirel yaklaşımı ve anlatı yapısının yanı sıra insan-doğa ilişkisi, kader, tanrılar, etik ve siyaset gibi temalara dair görüşleri bir bütün olarak ele alınmalıdır. Ayrıca onun farklı kültürlere yaklaşımı, yabancı toplumların geleneklerini aktarma biçimi ve bu süreçte sergilediği kültürel çoğulcu ve yorumlayıcı (hermeneutik) tutum da özel bir önem taşımaktadır. Bu bölümde, Herodot’un Historiai [Tarih] adlı eserinin ünlü ilk cümlesinden yola çıkılarak, onun tarihyazımına özgü nitelikleri ve tarih felsefesine sunduğu katkılar, modern araştırmacıların değerlendirmeleri ışığında incelenmektedir. Tartışma, Herodot’un yöntemsel ve anlatımsal tercihlerinden başlayarak tarihsel olgulara yaklaşımındaki etik ve teolojik boyutlara, kültürel temsillerdeki çoğulculuğuna ve siyasal düşüncelerine uzanmakta; nihayetinde Herodot’un tarih felsefesi bağlamında bıraktığı entelektüel miras değerlendirilmektedir. (shrink)